£4/75 



/ 



pH83 



THE 



ANNUAL ADDRESS 



DELIVERED AT THE 



TWENTY-THIRD REUNION 



Society of the Army of the Cumberland 



CHICKAMAUGA, GEORGIA 



September 14 and 15, 1892 



HENRY V. BOYNTON 

Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. V, 



CINCINNATI 

ROBERT CLARKE & CO 

1892 



T H K 



ANNUAL ADDRESS 



DKI.IVEKKD A|- TIIK 



TWENTY-THIRD REUNION 



Society of the Army of the Cumberland 



CHICK AM AUG A, GEORGIA 



September 14 and 15, 1892 



HENRY V. BOYNTON 

Brevet Brigadier-General U. S. V. 



CINCINNATI 
ROBERT CLARKE & CO 

1892 



61503 
»J5 






AXKUAL ADDRESS 



GMCNERAL H. V. BOYNTON. 



Mr. President, Ladies arid Gentlemen, O'omrades : 

We gray-beards of the Army df the Cumberland have met 
again on ground made familiar to us, both by the horrors and 
the glories of war, to find that the nation has risen to a due ap- 
preciation of its history and significance, and, with the consent 
of the states in which the fields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga 
lie, has raised its flag of eminent domain over them, as spots 
pre-eminently deserving national care and preservation. 

A generation has passed since we stood here, shoulder to 
shoulder, doing battle for that Union and nationality which have 
■ come, and come to stay forever. It is difficult to recognize the 
boys of '61 in the silver hairs and changed forms and features 
which the afternoon of life for all of us, and its very evening for 
many, have stamped upon these survivors of 1892 ; but, in spite 
of these, our hearts and hands and greetings are still those of 
the very heyday of youth — are as strong, as earnest, and as 
true as when we were the boys in blue of thirty years ago. 
Aged men of the Army of the Cumberland — heroes of the Army 
of the Cumberland — I salute you, one and all. 

The military committees of both Houses of Congress, by 
unanimous vote and formal report, have declared that upon this 
ground " occurred some of the most remarkable tactical move- 
ments and the deadliest fighting of the war of the rebellion;" 



Jf. Army of the Cuniherland. 

and Congress itself, with the same unanimity, has in the act es- 
tablishing the National Military Park, declared these to be fields 
of " some of the most remarkable maneuvers and most brilliant 
fiffhtinj; in the war of the rebellion.*' Thus pass the clouds of 
misrepresentation and misinformation from Chickamauga, as the 
nation proclaims it to have presented the best illustration of 
American fighting, — and all who fought were Americans, regard- 
less of former nationality. 

AVhat has happened in regard to Chickamauga is true of the 
whole history of the Army of the Cumberland. You have often 
seen Lookout veiled with clouds, which, under the quickening 
breeze, even as you looked, were swept from its face, revealing 
the strength and beauty and enduring foundations of that moun- 
tain monarch. So truth has blown strongly over the history of 
the Army of the Cumberland, and the grand proportions of its 
record begin to stand out before all n)en like a mountain range 
above the fields of our military history; and soon, if we do our 
full dutv. in clear air it will abide in its strength in the sight of 
all the people, a crowned monarch on an everlasting throne. 

Through long years of controversy the Army of the Cumber- 
land is coming to its own. It is doubtful whether, in military 
history, there can be found another army with its notably great 
and successful recoi'd which contemporary Avriters of military 
history — I should rather say of military fiction — have so per- 
sistently misrepresented. It is not necessary to inquire into 
their motives or to asperse them. The fact remains that the 
Army of the Cumberland, Ah^v winning its victories in the field, 
has had to fight ever since to save the tine lecord of them for 
history. And it is only of recent years, Avhen the full official 
record has become accessible, and as the furtlier results of many 
Drolouijed and bitter controversies, tli;it the nivths of this dis- 
tortcd history are taking \\\) tlicir iiiiiicli intu (»l»li\i<)n. 

The same is true of its leading comniaudci-s — BuKLL, Rose- 



Annual Address. 



CRANS and Thomas. I am sure that in the minds of Army of 
the Cumberland men, General Buell now stands the accredited 
organizer of that mighty weapon with which his successors 
smote. Those who came after him strengthened it and bettered 
it, but the first shaping and the forging were his. Ilis troubles 
were inseparable from the early political period of the war. If 
there had been no political eclipse of the army about Washing- 
ton, there would have been no corresponding penumbra visible 
at the West. And this shadow at the -West was all suspicion. 
The suggestion of the Cumberland river campaign ; the un- 
sought, or at least unacknowledged assistance which saved Don- 
elson, and the glory of Shiloh are his. For the rest, what 
General Thomas saw when he twice protested against super- 
seding General Buell, upon the ground of its injustice, is 
now clear to us all. General Buell's aame and fame are 
steadily growing brighter as the years cast the light of the 
record over his way. 

And what, in the presence of our honored and beloved 
president, General Rosecrans, shall I say of the light which 
the record has thrown over his pathway, to the confusion of 
many writers, both of high and of low degree ? What need be 
said further than to name Rich Mountain, Carnifax Ferry, luka, 
Corinth and Stone River, the unparalleled strategy of the Tulla- 
homa and Chickamauga campaigns, and the final capture of this 
mountain stronghold of Chattanooga? As, in the case of Gen- 
eral Buell, we now know that General Thomas vehemently 
protested against the proposition to remove General Rosecrans, 
even going so far as to privately threaten to resign if it were 
finally ordered, a decision from which he was with difficulty per- 
suaded. When General Garfield started for Washington, a 
few days before this removal. General Thomas, in parting with 
him, said : " Garfield, you know the whole of this matter and 
the wrong that is being done Rosecrans. Make it your first 



Army of ilie Cumberland. 



business to set him right with those people in Washington." 
Mortifying to relate, this commission was not executed, and, as 
the direct result, the clouds settled thick and chill about him, 
and the man who will, without doubt, stand pre-eminent as the 
most brilliant strategist of the war, and who, by his last cam- 
paign and the capture of Chattanooga, had as effectually divided 
the Confederacy as had Gkaxt and Porter by opening the Mis- 
sissippi, was obliged to sit down in shadow and wait on the slow 
methods of history for his vindication. But, in the evening of 
his life, with his faculties to enjoy it unabated, it has come, and 
it will abide for him forever. 

Next we come to a name that excites universal acclaim from 
every fair-minded student or Avriter of our military history 
wherever its wide and still-spreading fame has reached. George 
H. TiiOiMAS — that great Virginian, and greater American — is rap- 
ily coming to his own. His stature in history is rounding out 
to the full dimensions which we know to have been his. Of him, 
and of him alone, among all our great and honored captains, can 
it be truthfully said that he never lost a movement or a battle. 
Mill Springs was the first Union victory of the three years' 
campaign, and it was complete. We know how the center held 
and what it did at Stone River. The world knows the si^iiifi- 
cance of his title, " The Rock of Chickamauga." Every suc- 
cessful feature of the three days' battles about Chattanooga was 
his, and not another's. Every modification of the plan of battle 
was his, and every portion of the plan which succeeded was 
modified. Had his advice, based nn full reconnoisance, been fol- 
lowed of making a feint before the gorges at Rocky Face, and 
sending the army rapidly through undefended Snake Creek Gap, 
the decisive battle of the Atlanta campaign would have been 
fought in the vicinity of Resaca. He protested against Kene- 
saw, urn! his hands wei-e clear of the Idooil of that needless and 
80 wicked slaughter. lie was tiinicd Imck IVoiu Atlanta with the 



Annual Address. 



small, but valiant Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, and the rem- 
nants which were cast off when a selected army was organized 
for a picnic to the sea, to do battle with these and whatever 
else he might gather against the whole force which had con- 
fronted the three combined Union armies from Dalton to At- 
lanta. Never was greater though unintentional tribute paid to 
his ability. The commanders whom he was saving from the 
sneers of mankind, railed at him from Washington and Savan- 
nah, but with an imperturbability without parallel under the cir- 
cumstances, at the risk of removal, in the face of removal, and, 
as we know now, after the order for removal, he prepared the 
blow^ which, when it fell at Nashville, utterly destroyed the op- 
posing army and saved the march to the sea from everlasting 
ridicule. And here it is pertinent to remark that this was the 
only great Confederate army destroyed in battle, before the final 
surrender, by any Union commander. 

On the 28th of February, 1864, the month before Grant 
was made Lieutenant-General, and Sherman ordered to Chat- 
tanooga, General Thomas, having thoroughly reconnoitered the 
position at Dalton, thus offered to undertake an Atlanta cam- 
paign himself: 

" I believe, if I can commence the campaign with the 
Fourteenth and Fourth Corps in front, with Howard's corps in 
reserve, that I can raove along the line of the railroad and over- 
come all opposition as far, at least, as Atlanta." 

When the armies had reached Atlanta, he was much con- 
cerned over the information which reached there in relation to 
the suffering condition of our prisoners at Andersonville, Amer- 
icus and Millen. He then proposed to Sherman that with the 
Army of the Cumberland he might be detached and sent to re- 
lease those prisoners, and carry them with him, either to the At- 
lantic or one of the Gulf ports. This may have been the 
germinal idea which prompted the march to the sea, although, 



jirniy of the Cumherl and. 



when that march was matle, both Tiio.MAS and the prisoners were 
left behind. 

I said that General Thomas was the only commander in the 
war for whom it could be claimed that he never lost a single 
movement, or a battle, of his own onlerin'ij. How nearly this is 
also true of General Rosecuans, our president, let his record 
tell — Rich Mountain, Carnifax Ferry, luka, Corinth, Stone River, 
the wonderful Tullahoma, and Chickamauga campaigns, the cap- 
ture of Chattanooga — every thing from the day he entered the 
field until he left it, except the little which he lost on the second 
day of Chickamauga — and how little that was, compared with 
the niisrejtresentations of the day, the country has at last dis- 
covered. Can the great and honored commanders of any other 
army, just and entluring as is their fame, match these records of 
Thomas and Roskcuan.<? 

The time lias come at last, with the full disclosures of the 
official records, when false history, which has been long current, 
can be corrected and true history written. To see that this is 
done for the Army of the Cumberlatid, should be a pressing duty 
with this Society — pressing, because there is so much to correct, 
and because our inaich to the bivouac above draws rapidly to- 
ward its close. 

Much has been written in direct disparagement of this armv 
untler its various titles of the Army of the Ohio, the Fourteenth 
Corps, and the Army <f tin' Cumhvrhtnd, and much injustice 
done as well in sins of historical omission by those whose names 
and fame and higii positions gave their words great weight, and 
caused them to be accepted as authority, both at home and 
abroad. Let us l)rietly examine a few of these points. You 
will look in vain in these alleged histories for the fact that tiie 
ten thousand men sent by(ij.M.UAr. Hi'KLI., without reijuest from 
GkaNT, saved Donelson Ity driviii;: Micknku Itack into his works 
wh<-n he fttarled t<( cut his wav out with his coiniiiaiid. .And in 



Annual Address. 



this instance the commander of Buell's troops attacked of his 
own motion, as General Grant was not at the time on the field, 
but in conference with Commodore Foote on the gunboats. 

Here are a few of the assertions to be found in these widely 
accepted histories : " Buell's army was not needed at Shiloh." 
"It exerted no influence on the first day, and on the second the 
victory would have been complete without it." " It was doubt- 
ful whether General Buell would cross his army over the river 
at all for the battle." To sustain the theory that there Avas no 
surprise and to keep the Army of the Ohio in the background, 
Ave find oflicial maps, most elaborately prepared, which, in their 
essential features, no more resemble the real Shiloh than the 
current map of the planet Mars. 

According to the same authorities, the Army of ihc Cumber- 
land Avas inexcusably sIoav after Stone River ; exasperatingly slow 
after its splendid TuHahoma campaign ; Avas routed in disaster 
at Chickamauga ; Avas so demoralized by that battle that it Avas 
feared by General Grant that it could not be gotten out of the 
trenches before this city for a battle ; tHat it might fight, he 
thought, after Sherman's array should arrive and take the of- 
fensive first ; and that Thomas was so sIoav at Nashville as to 
call for his removal. The publication of the oflicial history of 
the Atlanta campaign brings out repeated attacks upon the Army 
of the Cumberland, Avhich were the more injurious at the time 
because secretly made. Witness the folloAving extract from a 
semi-official letter from General Sherman to General Grant, 
dated June 18, 1864, and noAV printed on page 507, of Volume 
38, Part 4, of the War Records : 

" My chief source of trouble is Avith the Army of the Cum- 
berland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a ploAved 
field will stop the Avhole column, and all begin to intrench. I 
have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that Ave must 
assail and not defend ; Ave are the off"ensive, and yet it seems the 



lU Arinij of tJie Cutiiberlaiid. 

whole Army of the Cumberland is so liabituateil to be on the de- 
fensive tliiit, from its commander down to the hiwest private, I 
can not get it out of their heads." 

This is a fair specimen of several similar attacks which the 
published record now for the first time discloses. Though the 
discovery of such records indicates what was going on in secret 
while the Army of the Cumberland was performing the full pro- 
portion of General Sherman's work which rightly belonged to 
its preponderating numbers, it is altogether unnecessary before 
this audience to even dignify them with a denial. 

These errors and others, which will occur to members of the 
Society, with which these histories and memoirs abound, have 
been too long neglected. Through a revival of cheap editions 
they are again gaining wide circulation. The injury they do is 
well illustrated by the fact that such an able and impartial 
•writer as the (Jount of Paris has accepted some of them because 
of the weight of authority which they carried; while Lord 
WooLSEY has swallowed them all with avidity from apparent in- 
clination, iind they are floating over the English-speaking world, 
incorporated in his thistle-down of military criticisms. 

The time has come, in the interest of truthful history, to 
treat such things as they deserve. And the Society of the 
Army of the Cumberland^ and especially its many excellent 
writers and close students, will fail in their duty to that army's 
magnificent record, to its dea<l heroes, and to itself, if they do 
not use the facilities whicii the jiublished recoi'd now aftbrds 
them, to stamj) out venerable falsehoods which have been given 
currency as history and install truth in their place. There is 
this to encourage us in such work. With its present full access 
to the records, and the fact that a generation is on the stage 
which is learning of the war by reading and study, the country 
is revising many of the estimates which were formed in the hot 
atmosphere of actual war. In this revision of conchisions, it is 



Annual Address. 11 



pleasant to note that the Army of the Cumberland, the country 
over, is rapidly being conceded that leading rank to which we, 
who knew, and loved, and trusted its commanders, and helped 
them fight their battles, know it to be entitled. 

In spite of all the gross errors of statement to which refer- 
ence has been made, but three things can be cited in its history 
which come even witiiin the range of failures. These are the 
withdrawal to the Ohio, as a result of Bragg's flanking move- 
ment ; the escape of Bragg after Perryville and the disaster of 
Kenesaw. The first w^as held by many men of recognized mili- 
tary ability to be both wise and necessary, and the only move- 
ment by which the Confederates could certainly be turned back 
from Kentucky, and Louisville and Cincinnati saved. The sec- 
ond was relieved by the fact that it was a victory to the extent 
of again clearing Kentucky of the enemy and driving him back 
to Central Tennessee, while the entire odium of the failure and 
the needless slaughter of Kenesaw falls wholly outside of the 
lines of that army upon the one who ordered the butchery. 

When the commanders of other armies, either as authors, or 
in the person of writers who hold the formal indorsement of 
these commanders, write of the failures of our army, and whose 
sole liberality toward it are the liberalities of criticism, it is but 
fair to institute comparisons, 

Belmont was a disaster; Shiloh was unquestionably an in- 
excusable surprise ; Chickasaw Bayou was an assault without 
possibilities of success ; the Meridian campaign fell short ; there 
was dire failure in one attack on Vicksbiirg ; the only miscar- 
riao-e in the battle of Chattanooga was at the north end of Mis- 
sionary Ridge; the bloody battle of Atlanta, where the com- 
mander of the Army of the Tennessee was killed, resulted from 
the mistaken announcement from the headquarters of the armies 
that Atlanta was evacuated, coupled with a general order for 
pursuit, which plunged one army marching by the flank, unex- 



12 Army of the Ciunherland. 

pcctedly into the eiieniy's linos. These are comparisons, bv way 
of criticisms, that only concern couinianders. But, in citing 
them, we do not forget that they won many glorious victories 
whose fame will never fade from our natfonal history. These 
are failures, too. which do not in any sense detract from the 
splemlid cMunage and unfaltering fighting ability of the subordi- 
nate ollicors and soldiei-s who endured the hardships, suffered the 
wounds, or died because of these mistakes. Nor is it an attack 
upon General Grant or General Sherman to apply the test of 
the official records to their histories. Whatever passes that test 
will stand. All else of right should fall, and if we do our duty, 
will fall. The fame of these great captains is assured beyond 
the power of pen or word to destroy it. Their great services to 
the state will cause their names to live among the heroes of the 
republic so long as the nation's story shall be preserved for the 
ages to come. But it is not necessary t(» dim other records to 
brighten their's. In spite of spots, they will shine forever. If 
our Society does its duty, it will devote much attention hence- 
forth to the subject of the full and truthful history of that re- 
nowned army in which we served. Thus will all our noble armies, 
each and all of glorious record, come to their own. 

Why not, for example, tell the truth about Shiloli, when by 
so doing we establish it as one of the chief glories of the Army 
of the Tennessee? This is that "Story: Camped in a forest with- 
out regard to a line of battle, its commander nine miles away, 
with no adequate outpost or picket service, it was surprised at 
daylight ami thrown into much disoi'der by an army in regular 
and solid array bursting into its camps. But, in sjiite of these 
facts and the additional truth that thousands in its ranks had 
never met an enemy in arms, they sprang to their places and re- 
sisted, as they could, through all tiie long hours of that first 
day, aii<l resisted with a courage whicli. under the circumstances, 
was plieMoiueiial and wortliv of everlasting pi'aise ; and under 



Anmial Address. 13 



the brilliant example of Sherman and the stubborn command of 
Grant, they stood at nightfall broken, it is true, but uncon- 
quered, between Beauregard and the Tennessee, and when 
morning came, clasping the outstretched hand of Buell's suc- 
coring army, they advanced again with it to final and complete 
victory. 

Here is truth bestowing lasting honor. Turn from this for 
a moment to the overwhelming severity of criticism upon gen- 
eralship which the false theory that there was no surprise ren- 
ders unavoidable. Let it be conceded that the commanding gen- 
erals expected an attack. Then what shall be said of the gener- 
alship which allowed an entire army to go to sleep in utter igno- 
rance of the fact that those in command were looking for it? 
Or, of those other facts that no subordinate officers were in- 
formed and urged to prepare their lines for battle ; that ord- 
nance officers were not enlightened, so that ammunition might 
be provided ; that commissaries and quartermasters were not al- 
lowed to know of the danger, in order that they might withdraw 
or otherwise protect their stores ; that medical officers were not 
informed, so that their vitally important preparations might be 
made — in short, if there was no surprise, upon what possible 
theory which presupposes the faintest elements of generalship, 
shall the neglect of these most ordinary and imperative prepara- 
tions for battle be explained or excused? 

If there be a spot within the territory of the war where 
Army of the Cumberland men can meet and talk freely, frankly 
and without reserve, of the great events in which they were act- 
ors, surely it is this city of Chattanooga, that heard the guns on 
Snodgrass Hill, and the Kelley field, and which lies in the shad- 
ows of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. 

The campaign which secured it was of General Rosecrans' 
planning and execution. The subsequent opening of the river 
to supply it was his plan also, the details being decided upon 



i4 Arrrnj of the Cumberland. 

and carried out by General W. F. Smith after General 
Grant's arrival. Although General Grant was in command, 
and announced his order of battle, the battle of Chattanooga as 
fought was, in every thing which made it a success, the battle of 
General Thomas. 

The Chickamauga campaign was beyond question the most 
brilliant strategic campaign of the war. The natural obstacles 
to be overcome were far greater than in any other. The posi- 
tion of the enemy could not have been stronger. The diversion 
by which the crossings of the river were secured and the moun- 
tain passes seized was in itself a campaign. The front of the 
movement when it had crossed the Cumberland ranges and 
reached the valley of the Tennessee was 150 miles — more than 
the whole distance from Washington to Richmond, and every 
element of it moved with precision and without the slightest 
failure. Before Bragg had more than suspected the character 
of the movement, and before he could recall his army, which 
had been sent far up the river to meet the expected attempt at 
crossing there, Rosecrans' heads of columns were in the passes 
of Lookout, and descending the eastern slope of the mountain 
in rear of Chattanooga, and Bragg could only save his commu- 
nications and liis army by evacuating the place. 

Then came the deadly battle of Chickamauga for the military 
possession of this town. Bragg, reinforced from Richmond by 
Longstreet, started again toward Chattanooga, planning to 
thrust his columns between Rosecrans and the city. The latter, 
by a night march, playing at the same game, succeeded in plac- 
ing his head of column in the Chickamauga forests between 
Bragc! and Chattanooga, and the fierce struggle for the roads to 
the city began. When it ended, a new record of bitter, persist- 
ent, and deadly fighting had been made, not only for our war but 
for the modern worhl. In j)ercentages of losses and for the 
time of fighting there are no battle records Avhich equal it from 



Annual Address. 15- 



and including the days of the first Napoleon. It was, for both 
sides, as the figures of strength and losses show, the best illus- 
tration of the pluck, the endurance, and the stubborn, dogged 
courage of Ameriean soldiers which the war produced. And 
now that the bitterness of it has all passed, it is well for the 
nation to mark this field and preserve it as an object-lesson of 
Avhat Americans can do in war. 

The generally received version of Chickamauga has been 
that at its close the Union army retreated to Chattanooga. 
When the battle began, it was on the march for the city, which 
from the first had been the objective of the campaign. When 
the battle ended, the march of the Union army was still in ad- 
vance, not in retreat, and still for the occupation of Chattanooga.. 
As an army, it had never seen the city, and it did not see it till 
the second morning after Chickamauga. In a military sense, it 
had not yet been occupied by the Union army, and the battle of 
Chickamauga was to decide which side should gain possession of 
it. In the words of another, " Chickamauga was the price of 
Chattanooga." This mountain stronghold was worth the cost. 

At the East, and, in fact, in many portions of the country^ 
the magnitude of the operations, both as regards territory and 
numbers, in which the Army of the Cumberland engaged, has 
not been fully comprehended. Let us institute a few^ compari- 
sons with the Army of the Potomac. It operated mainly between 
Washington and Richmond. Here are some of the successive 
steps of the Army of the Cumberland in its advances : From 
the Ohio river to Central Kentucky ; thence to Central Tennes- 
see; thence to Northern Mississippi ; thence across Alabama to 
Eastern Tennessee ; thence back across both Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky to the Ohio ; thence again to Central Kentucky, to Central 
Tennessee, to Northern Georgia. And these giant strides only 
bring it to the threshold of the Atlanta campaign. Let us make 
a single comparison to bring out the character of its fighting : 



10 .Irmi/ of ihc CuDihevland. 

The Army of ihc Cumberland, at Cliickamauga, had only 
two less infantry regiments than the Army of the Potomac in the 
Seven Days" Battles, and Bkaiii; liad only three less than the 
Army if Northern Virginia in tliose battles, a total difference 
for the conihiiKM] armies of only five regiments of infantry. The 
losses of RosECUANS at Chickamauga in two days were 16,179, 
and of McClellan in the Seven Days' only 15,849, or 330 less 
than RosECRANS : of Bragg in two days, 17,804 ; of Lee in 
Seven Days', 19,749. Rosecrans' missing, notwithstanding the 
long-current exaggerations of the disaster to liis right, were 
only 4,774, against 6,053 in the Seven Days' Battles. The total 
losses of both sides in the Seven Days' Battles were only 1,615 
more than Rosecraxs' and Bragg's for the two days at Chicka- 
mauga. 

Concerning the widely-repeated statement that General 
Rosecrans, immediately upon reaching Chattanooga, decided to 
abandon it, this is true, namely, that Rosecrans was established 
around the city during the 22d of September. The afternoon 
of tliat day there was some consideration given at headquarters 
to tlie question of retreat to the nortli side of the i-iver in case 
reinforcements could not be speedily forwarded, and dispatches 
designed to make tliis reinforcement appear most urgent were 
sent to Washington. But that very evening the question was 
finally decided, and the decision, as telegraphed to Washington 
by Mr. Dana, was to hold the town :it all hazards. Two days 
later, he reported it so strong that it (.•ouhl only be taken by 
regular sieore. 

General Rosecrans has been severely criticised by unfriendly 
writers for abandoning Lookout Mountain shortly after his oc- 
cupation of Chattanooga, uj)on the theory that he thus yielded 
the control of the river to ]}ra(;g. We, who are ac(juainted 
with the ground, know the fallacy of this criticism. To have 
maintained a line fidni Chattanooga to the crest of Lookout 



Annual Address. 



Mountain merely to hold that position, would have made neces- 
sary a heavy fortified line three miles in extent and open to 
most favorable lines of attack, and this would have in no sense 
controlled the river, since Brag(J held the roads over the moun- 
tain. He could have established a force at a point on tlie river 
beyond the range of the guns on Lookout, and still have effectu- 
ally closed that line of supplies. Rosecrans' witlidrawal from 
the mountain, therefore, greatly strengthened his position at 
Chattanooga, and exposed him to no additional dangers, either 
from the closing of the river or Bragg's batteries on the moun- 
tain, since the latter were at no time able to inflict any serious 
damage upon the Union forces. 

By the middle of October, the question of holding the city 
turned on that of supplying the troops. A raid of Wheeler's 
cavalry, north of the river, the 1st of October, had destroyed 
between two hundred and fifty and three hundred wagons. The 
rains which followed made it impossible to haul much more than 
forage to last the trains over the sixty miles of mountains. 
However, October 13, the army was receiving three-fourths ra- 
tions, and was very comfortable, and that very day three hun- 
dred thousand full rations arrived. The animals suffered 
greatly, for corn was taken from them for the men. Although 
the army was on very short rations, at no time did the men 
actually suffer, and at no time were the troops of the Army 
of the Cumberland, as an army, either discouraged or demoral- 
ized. All statements to the contrary, and such have gained wide 
currency, are of that class of historical myths which are fast 
disappearing under impartial study. 

There were controversies over the responsibility for the dis- 
aster to the right wing at Chickamauga, and sharp criticisms of 
several ofiicers, including the general in command, and other in- 
dications of this kind of demoralization. But the Army of the 
Cumberland, as an army, never complained of its short supplies, 



18 



Army of the Cumherlnnd. 



never for a iiiniui-iit lost the spii-it which liehl the bulk of it on 
tin- Horseshoe innier 'Piiomas that Smitlay afternoon at Chicka- 
niauga. ami, so far as the s])irits of the men Avere concerned, there 
was never a day when its lines could not have been led against 
Missionary Ridge with the same magnificent elan as that which 
finally planted its victorious banners along the crest. Men fol- 
lowed the wagons fur the crumbs of crackers whicli they could 
|»ick u|i : they gatheretl tlu' scattered kernels of corn about the 
store houses, for parching; they ate moldy crackers, and sour 
pork — when they could get it — and all the time looked up at 
the snjokin;; batteries on Lookout, or out on the enemy's flags 
along Missionai'V Kidge. with the same grim determination and 
exultation with which, on Snodgrass Hill, when their ammunition 
WHS gone, they awaited Loxgstreet'.s assaults, and repelled 
them time and again with their empty barrels and bayonets. 

But the river line of sujjplies to Kelly's Ferry was opened 
at length, the problem of holding the town was finally solved, 
an<l the prophecy of starvation and disaster utteretl by Jeffer- 
son Davis from the Point of Lookout was brought to nought. 

It is another of the myths of history — which are as thick 
about these oj)erations as the fogs over Lookout in falling 
weather — that the coming of Grant had something to do with 
this opening of the rivei'. Ti'ui'. he upproved jilans which he 
found jterfected down to the smallest details. Lut these would 
have been executed exactly in their final form and time, if 
Grant had not been ordereil to < 'iiattanooga. 

TIk- general plan of opening the 'I'eiinessee to the vicinity 
of William's Lslan<l was Kushcuans" own. The details were 
committed to (Jknekai. \V. F. Smith, lie fixed on Brown's 
Ferry a.s the |ilace for throw iii<,r the liridges, and General 
IlosKCKANs was engageil in the general reconnoitering of the 
river b«dow Lookout the day that the order for his releif fioia 
the cijiiiiiiand arrived. Thai verv iliiv lie had ordered IIookkr 



Annual Address. 19 



to be ready to move up from Bridgeport along the south bank 
of the river, and that night, upon assuming command, one of 
General Thomas's first orders was to direct Hooker to be 
ready to execute General Rosecrans' last order. Grant 
came, approved the plans already fully perfected and gave orders 
for their execution — nothing more. They were executed and 
the line of abundant supply was open. 

It is now possible to fix the responsibility for this lack of 
supplies at Chattanooga where it properly belongs. When that 
wonderful transfer of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the 
Potomac to the Tennessee was ordered, General Rosecrans had 
a right to suppose that upon General Hooker's arrival at 
Bridgeport he would be able to co-operate at once for the relief 
of Chattanooga. Hooker reached that point October 1, and the 
same day was ordered by Rosecrans to put down his bridges and 
make immediate preparations for crossing the river to move 

toward Chattanooga. Then it was found that he had no wagon 
trains, and so he could not obey. 

The finely equipped and thoroughly efficient field trains 
of these two Eastern corps had been turned in at Alexandria and 
orders issued that new trains should be furnished at Nashville. 
But the Nashville depot had been thoroughly depleted, having 
only exhausted animals and crippled wagons. When at length 
apologies for trains had been fitted up, the extra Eastern railroad 
rollino; stock had been sent back, and these wagon trains were 
obliged to march 125 miles, much of the way over rough and 
mountain roads, to Bridgeport. As a result. Hooker was held 
immovable at that point from October 1 to October 27th — in 
other words throughout the entire time of short supplies at 
Chattanooga. Had his trains been shipped from the East, so as 
to follow his troops, he could have occupied the Wauhatchie 
Valley during the first week in October; or, in other words, 
before the pinch over short supplies at Chattanooga began. 



20 Army of the Cumberland. 



Uii Uctoboi- 1-. (Iknkkal llosECUANS repeated his order to 
HooKKR to move u]i to Wiuiliatchie to open the river, but his 
trains wore still heliiiid. On the l'.>th, the order to be ready to 
move was again given by Ruseckans, and repeated the same 
night bv Thomas, who th«n had succeeded to the command. 
Finally, on the lioth and •Jtitii. llnoKHit's trains arrived. At day- 
light of the 27th he crossetl the river at Bridgeport, the rear of 
his column passing the bridge at It:o<) a. m. At 8 o'clock in the 
afternoon nf the next day he was at Wauhatchie, in Lookout 
Vallev : and at ') o'clock at Brown's Ferry, and the line of 
sujiplics was open. It is easily seen that the failure to send 
HuOKKu's splendidly-i'ijuipped trains from the East, upon the 
erroneous lielief that this essential need could be supplied at 
Nashville, is the historical fact wliit-li so nearly caused starva- 
tion at (.'hattanooga. 

While ("hickamauga is fast coming out into the liglit, and 
the nation is beginning to faiily umlerstanil it, there are several 
important points of widely accepteil but most erroneous history 
connected with the battle of Missionary Ilidge. whicli deserve 
attention. 1 have said that the battle of Chattanooga, though 
planned an<l ordered by Gknkhai, (iuAXT, was Gexerai, Thomas's 
battle in all its successful fcatuics. As is well known, it was 
fought by the A 1/111/ i>f lilt' Cniiifiirliiiiil proj)er, to which was 
assigned LiE.N'EUAL Hooker's Eastern :niiiy. and the Army 
nf the Ttniii'H»ft' under Generai- Siikkma.n, (Jkm;i{ai, Grant 
being in command of the whole. 

Tlie plan of battle, as annoiiiu'ed in orders by General 
(jRANT, involved the holding of Lookout valley by (lEXEKAl. 
lluoKER, and his observation of BitAiiOs left; the crossing of 
the Tennessee at night by (Jenerai, Siikr.MAN. opposite the north 
end of Missionary Kidge, and carrying the ridge at daylight by 
surjirise as fur south as the tunnel. Tliis was the ccntial and 
controlling fctiture of tin- |ilan of l»aitlc. (Jeneral Thomas was 



Annual Address. 21 



then to close to the left, in front of Ch:itt!inoo<2;a, unite with 
Sherman's right, and advancing up the valley, as Sherman swept 
southward along the ridge, and conforming to his movements, 
protect the flank of the Army of the Tennessee, while it con- 
ducted the main work of the battle, and assist in this position 
of minor importance and restricted activities, in driving Bragg 
from his depot and communications at Chickamauga station. 

Three days in succession the order for battle was postponed 
because Sherman had not been able to get up at the appointed 
time. Then, at General Thomas's request, the plan of battle 
was so changed as to allow Hooker to assault Lookout, and the 
time for his move was fixed for November 24th. Meantime, 
there was intense anxiety at headquarters while awaiting Sher- 
man, lest Bragg should learn the plans for attack ; and a report 
that the enemy was withdrawing led Grant, on the 23d of No- 
vember, to order General Thomas to make a reconnoisance in 
front of the city to ascertain whether the camps and earth-works 
there were still occupied. Of his own accord Thomas turned 
this into an advance of his army, and, sweeping out from Fort 
Wood with a front of two divisions, supported by three on the 
flanks, he carried and reversed, and held the enemy's central 
lines through the plain. This was an entire departure from the 
plan of battle. The next "day came the memorable assault and 
successful carrying of Lookout Mountain by Hooker, acting un- 
der orders from Thomas — a second and most radical departure 
from the plan. 

Here, in the shadow of Lookout, let us revive our recollec- 
tions of that scene when the flag of the Union was borne on the 
rising flood of battle to its very crest. Hooker, for the assault, 
had Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, Osterhaus' of the 
Fifteenth, and Cruft's of the Fourteenth. With these in battle 
array at the western foot of the mountain in Lookout Valley, 
the notable and never-to-be-forgotten movement began. Here, 



ig Army of the Cumberland. 



these soldiers from the Army of (he Potomac, from the Army of 
the Tenni'»»ee, an<l the Army of (he Cumberland met for the 
tirst time as they faced the mountain, and fought together 
tlirouj^h the day for its possession. 

Listen, my friends, those of you who listened twenty-nine 
years ago to the hoarse grumble of Hooker's guns rolling up 
with the mists from Lookout Valley, and see if you do not hear 
them still. Ah. yes I They come to you as they come to me. 
The ears which heard them then must be dulled by death before 
they will cease to respond to such entreating. 

rpon that nmrning the roars of battle approaching from 
Lookout Valley had intently fixed all eyes in both lines about 
Chattanooga upon the point of the mountain. But, while the 
battle drew rapi»lly nearer from the western side, the mists con- 
cealed all movements. Just as the Confederate lines had been 
pusheil back till they reached from the foot of the palisades 
under the point of the mountain to the river bluffs below, the 
fogs were widely rent, as if the curtain in some great play-house 
of the gods had been raised to show this tremendous battle scene 
on those slopes reaching upward toward the skies. For a little 
season the sun shone ov«'r the wonderful 1)ut indescribable pic- 
lure, gb'ametl brightly on lianners and bayonets, and rested 
softly on the white billows of the powdei- smoke. For an instant 
both armies looked on in silence, while each observer was solv- 
ing the hiluation for himself. But a glance showed clearly that 
the Confederate lines were coming back, and, a moment later, 
the banner.s of tin* I'liion, Hag after ilag. came into sight, stream- 
ing forward above the curling surf nf battle smoke. 'J'lien the 
Union army, stretched a«'ross the plain l)elow, cheered and 
cheered, and all the liands played on and nn. while Hooker's 
men, under thif* inspiration, and aidetl by the enhladinrr five 
of HkaNNAN'.S heavy batteries on .Moccasin Point, swept the 



Atimval Address. 23 



northern face of the mountain. Then the curtain of fog settled 
down again, as if the giant play were done. 

At 5 o'clock, by Thomas's order, Carlin's Brigade, from the 
Army of the Cumberland, in the plain before the city, climbed 
the niountain, with stores of aninnniition, to Hooker's position, 
and relieved his right under the palisades — a most energetic, 
courageous, and brilliant movement well performed. There was 
sharp skirmishing through most of the night, but this was to 
cover the Confederate withdrawal from the top of the mountain 
by the Summertown road. At daylight it was found that the 
summit had been abandoned. It had been a day's fight. It will 
live in history forever. 

■ The morning of the 25th broke bright and clear. The 
mountain Avas sharply defined against the sky. All the camps 
■were astir at the earliest dawn, and every eye was searching for 
signs which would show who held the summit. Just before sun- 
rise a group of soldiers stepped out on the rock which forms the 
overhanging point of the mountain. They carried a flag, but 
held it furled, waiting for the sun. The instant its rays broke 
full upon them, they loosened its folds, and the waiting thousands 
below beheld the Stars and Stripes. Then the cheers through- 
out the valley roared again like Niagara, and the pealing of the 
bands was as if all the harps of heaven were filling the dome 
with triumphal music. The day of Hooker's assault, Sherman 
having crossed the Tennessee during the night, moved in the 
afternoon, instead of at daylight as contemplated, toward Mis- 
sionary Ridge, but by a mistake in reconnoisance occupied and 
fortified a detached range of unoccupied hills in the valley of 
the Tennessee, instead of the north end of the ridge. This 
move was without opposition, even from pickets. The next day 
Sherman assaulted the real extremity of the ridge, and, although 
such troops as he ordered forward fought with desperate valor, 
his movement was altogether unsuccessful. 



:S^ Army of ihc Cinnherland. 



In the afti'i-noDii. in (uder to relieve SHERMAN, Thomas was 
onlered to advance tlie center against tlie rille pits at the foot of 
the ridge. He did more. He sent his center to the summit, 
while his right under Hooker turned Bragg's left — and the bat- 
tle (if Chattanooga was won. Thus, while everything which 
made the battle the wonderful success it proved to be, was the 
result iif modifications secured or caused by General Thomas, it 
is gravely asserted in one of the leading authorized histories to 
which reference has already been made, that this was one of the 
few battles of the war. fought from first to last, exactly accord- 
ing to the original jiian. 

The oidy modification of the plati suggested by General 
Thomas, and not accepted by General Grant, was that Sher- 
man'.s army should be brought into Chattanooga by night over 
the existing' bridges, and marched alonjir the south bank of the 
river to its proposed position opposite the north point of Mission- 
ary Kidge, instead of undertaking the enormous work and incur- 
ring the risks of delay and accident incident to crossing 20,000 
men by night from North Chickamauga. But Grant, finding 
the north end of Missionary Ridge unoccupied, thought it could 
be best secured by this latter crossing and a following surprise, 
and directed General Thomas to make the preparations for it. 
In spite of storm and floods, and almost impassable roads, 
these were completed on time, as it was certain they would be 
under those able engineers, Generals W. F. Smith and James 
II. \N'n.soN. and every thing was ready for General Sherman's 
part, \shich was to arrive, iiiaich over, and sur])rise the north 
en<l of .Missionary Ki<lge. That no such exhaustive work was 
necesHury, iH shown by the fact that (Jkneral Howard, accom- 
panied only by his escort and three regiments of infantrj', rode 
up from ('hiittanooga, alon^j the south liank of the river, and 
wiiH the first to welcome Gk.nkrai. Sni:i:.MAN as he came over 
tlic bridge. As if to eiiipluisi/.e the meaning of this and vindi- 



Annual Address. 25 



cate General Thomas's proposed modification of the plan, How- 
ard left his troops with Sherman and rode back to the city with 
his escort alone. If there could be any thing comical in war, 
this meeting would deserve the attention of the wits. 

To make this situation the more remarkable, at daylight, 
when General Sherman had two divisions aggregating 8,000 
men in line facing Missionary Ridge, there was no enemy in 
force, either on the ridge or along its base, within two miles and 
a half of General Sherman's position. Further than this, none 
of the Confederate forces on the ridge were nearer than a mile 
and a quarter from the hill over the tunnel, which was his ob- 
jective, until after two o'clock of the day he crossed the river, 
nor were any ordered toward it till that hour. If he had 
marched at daylight for Tunnel Hill, as was contemplated by the 
order of battle, he could have occupied the entire north end of 
Missionary Ridge, not only to the tunnel, but for some distance 
south of it, without encountering a Confederate in arms. 

He moved to attack the ridge at one o'clock in the after- 
noon, having five divisions in his column. It was not until two 
o'clock that Cleburne, then on Missionary Ridge, a mile and a 
quarter south of Tunnel Hill, was instructed to move to that 
point to resist Sherman. Cleburne did not occupy the posi- 
tion until 2:30 P. m. It was not entrenched when he reached it, 
and throughout the afternoon he had only three brigades, and 
one battery with each, with which to hold it against Sher- 
man's five divisions. 

But the astonishing error, an error which caused utter fail- 
ure to the whole movement against Braug's right, and which 
ever since has been covered thick in official reports and mis- 
leading histories, was the first day's occupation of the range of 
detached hills north and west of Missionary Ridge, and com- 
pletely separated from it by a wide pass which cuts down to the 
bases of the hill. Since the plan of battle turned on occupying 



£6 At my of the Cinnberland . 

the north end of the ridge, it was certainly one of the most re- 
markable oversights of the war, that this position was not thor- 
oughly identified. Even the John Phoenix method of prelim- 
inary reconnoitering, namely, when roads, distances, and posi- 
tions were not known, or had been omitted from his notes, to 
stop at a farm-house, and ask a citizen, would have answered the 
purpose, since every field-hand in the vicinity of the landing 
could have given the needed information. 

So, at daylight of the 25th, when Sherman found himself 
on a crest, one thousand yards distant from Cleburne's works 
on the real north point of Missionary Ridge, with a deep gorge 
between the lines, in order to assault the enemy's position he 
was obliged to move down an open slope, under the direct fire of 
the Confederate guns and rifles, and then up the steep ascent 
opposite to his fortified lines. 

Nevertheless, Sherman moved promptly. His lines suf- 
fered heavily in the descent, to the foot of Missionary Ridge, 
and were repulsed in the direct assaults which followed. How- 
ard's remaining division had been hurried toward him from the 
center at an early hour, thus giving him six divisions against the 
five brigades then at the control of Cleburne, on Sherman's 
front. After a second repulse, Baird's division was dispatched 
from the extreme right of TuOxMas's advanced lines to Sher- 
man's assistance, leaving Thomas with only three divisions. 
When ]} Aii'tD arrived there was no place, with the six divisions 
already on the ground, to put him in, and lie was sent back to 
Thomas, fortunately reaching the left of the hitter's line just in 
time for the grand assault of the Army of the Cmnberland on 
the center. 

This seems to ])e the proper place to give the needed atten- 
tion to that venerable but still stalwart misstatement that Sher- 
man's assault caused Brauu to so weaken his center as to make 
Thomas's assault there successful. All reports, memoirs, and 



Annual Address. 



histories to the contrary, nothing of the kind occurred. Not a 
single regiment or a single piece of artillery was withdrawn 
from in front of the Army of the Cumberland at any time duiing 
the day. 

It is best to present the contrary statements in their bold- 
est and most authoritative form. Says Grant in his report : 
*' Discovering that the enemy, in his desperation to defeat or re- 
sist the progress of Sherman, was weakening his center on ]Mis- 
sionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance (of Thomas) 
at once." 

Grant thus wrote Sherman at the close of the fight : " No 
doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas's 
troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a 
just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your com- 
mand in taking, first, so much of the same range of hills, and 
then in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to 
make Thomas's part certain of success." 

Grant, in his memoirs, says : " From the position I occu- 
pied I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving 
against Sherman. Every Confederate gun that could be brought 
to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him." 

Sherman, in his report of the battle, says : " Column after 
column of. the enemy was streaming toward me. Gun after gun 
poured its concentric shot on us from every hill and spur that 
gave a view of any part of the ground held by us" (and when 
he saw that Thomas was moving on the center), " I knew our at- 
tack had drawn vast masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt 
sure of the result." 

Says Badeau, in his " Military History of Grant" : 
*' Grant was watching the progress of the fight from Orchard 
Knob. ... A massive column of Bragg's force soon was 
seen to move northward along the crest of the ridge, regiment 
after regiment filing toward Sherman. . . . Grant had 



S8 Army of the Cumberland. 

marked the movement of the rebel column toward his left and 
instantly perceived his opportunity. Bragg was attempting the 
most difficult maneuver that can be executed in war. He was 
weakening his center and making a flank movement in the pres- 
ence of an enemy. . . . He (Grant) determined to order 
the assault." 

And again : 

" Sherman's assault began, and was so determined, and at 
so critical a point, that Bragg threw battalion after battalion to 
resist the Army of the Tennessee.- That army was indeed re- 
sisted ; was unable to make its way ; but this was accomplished 
only by the sacrifice of all that Bragg was fighting for. The 
rebel center, as Grant had foreseen, was weakened to save the 
right, and then the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland 
was precipitated on the weakened point ; the center was pierced, 
the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won." 

In the face of all these statements, I repeat that not a 
single Confederate soldier Avas withdrawn from Thomas's front 
to Sherman's on this final day of the battle. All the Confed- 
erate reports are clear and specific on this point. They tell, in 
detail, what was done. 

At daylight of November 25th, three brigades of Cle- 
burne's division, namely Smith, Lowrey and Govan, with three 
batteries, were intrenched at Tunnel Hill in front of Sherman. 
At sunrise. Brown's brigade of Stevenson's division arrived 
near the tunnel from Lookout Mountain, and at 9 o'clock Cum- 
ming's brigade of the same division arrived and reported to 
Cleburne, and this comprised his whole force up to 2:30 p. m. 
of the 25t]i. Dn the night of the 23d, after the capture of Or- 
chard Knob, Walker's division had been brought from the eastern 
foot of Tiookout, and posted on Missionary Ridge, considerably 
north of Thomas's front, and three-quarters of a mile from Tun- 
nel Hill. At 2 p. M. of the 25th, Maney's brigade of this di- 



Aiinu.al Address. ..'9 



vision was dispatched to Cleburne. And this latter move rep- 
resents the whole of the "streaming along Missionary Ilidge 
toward Sherman" for the entire period after the battle opened, 
except the march of one small regiment of Brown's brigade of 
Stevenson's division, which was belated by coming down from 
Lookout by a circuitous route. This movement of Maney from 
far north of Thomas's position, and the maneuvering of Cle- 
burne's forces in the vicinity of Tunnel Hill, form the sole basis 
for the visual errors of the day, and the subsequent persistent 
and remarkable distortion of history. 

While Cleburne had six brigades besides the three guarding 
his bridges available against Sherman's six divisions of seven- 
teen brigades, in his congratulations after the battle to those who 
fought it he thus wrote : 

" It is but justice for me to state that the brunt of this 
long day's fight was borne by Smith's (Texas) brigade, and the 
Second, Fifteenth, and Twenty-fourth Arkansas (consolidated), 
of Govan's brigade, together with Sweet's and Key's bat- 
teries. The remainder of my division was only engaged in 
heavy skirmishing. The final charge Avas participated in, and 
successful, through the timely appearance and gallant assistance 
of the regiments of Cumming's and Maney's brigades, before 
mentioned. ... I sufi'ered the following losses in the three 
brigades of my division engaged, viz.: 42 killed, 178 wounded, 
and 2 missing. . . . My thanks are also due to Brigadier- 
Generals Polk and Lowrey and Colonel Govan, commanding 
brigades. Although not actually engaged, they were rendering 
good service in holding important positions. . . . Brigadier- 
General John C. Brown's brigade (Stevenson's division), on my 
left flank, was engaged in heavy skirmishing most of the day." 

Of course that portion of Sherman's force which was en- 
gaged, fought with splendid courage and sufi'ered heavy losses. 
But, astonishing as it seems, it is nevertheless true that of the 



30 virniy of the Cumberland. 

seventeen brigades under Sherman's command throughout the 
the day in front of Cleburne's position, eleven were not at any 
time brought into action. Of Howard's two divisions of five 
brigades only one brigade was sent into the fight. General 
Jeff. C. Davis, whose division from the Army of the Cumber- 
land numbered 7,000 men, asked permission of General Sher- 
man to assault the ridge from its eastern base, where the slope 
was comparatively gradual, but was refused, and he took no part 
in the action. Neither histories, memoirs, nor reports give any 
explanations of these remarkable facts. 

It is pleasant to turn from these errors, myths, and myste- 
ries of the left, to the grand culmination of that memorable day 
at the center, namely, to that miracle of military story, the 
storming of Missionary Ridge by the Army of the Cumberland. 

During the day Thomas's center lines faced the ridge for 
two miles and a half at an average distance of a mile from the 
crest and in plain view of the troops in the earthworks at the 
base and along the summit. He was waiting, according to di- 
rections, for Sherman's forces to carry the ridge to the tunnel, 
when he was to join their right for the movement up the valley. 
Meantime Thomas had early sent Howard's two divisions to help 
Sherman, and at 11 o'clock had also dispatched Baird to his as- 
sistance. The latter returned at 2:30 and took position on the 
left of Thomas's line, which was then formed, as already de- 
scribed, from right to left, as follows : JoHNSON, two brigades ; 
Sheridan, Wood, and Baird, each three brigades — in all eleven 
brigades and four batteries. Before him stretched a plain, for 
the most part open or very thinly wooded, extending to the earth- 
works at the foot of the ridge. Half way up the rough, steep^ 
rocky and tangled slope was a lighter line of rifie {'its, and above 
them the works along the crest. These defenses above and be- 
low were held in Thomas's front by four divisions, Stewart's on 
Braog's left, next Bate, then Anderson, then Cheatham, and 



Amiiutl Address. 31 



sixteen batteries, all the latter on the summit, and two siege 
pieces at Bracio's headquarters — in all, fourteen brigades of in- 
fantry, and the artillery just mentioned — a very different situ- 
ation from that at tiie iiortli end of the ridge, where seventeen 
Union brigades were confronted by only six. 

At 3 o'clock Thomas's lines stood ready to advance. The 
front was two miles and a half — the column four lines deep and 
covered with a cloud of skirmisiiers. This was a battle array 
of those soldiers of whom Sherman wrote thus in his Memoirs, 
citing Grant as his authority : " The men of Thomas's army 
had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga, that he 
(Grant) feared they could not be got out of their trenches to as- 
sume the offensive. The Army of the Cumhertand had been so 
long in the trenches tiiat he (Grant) wanted my troops to liurry 
up, to take the offensive first, after which he had no doubt the 
Cumberland Army would fight well.'' 

Standing before those frowning and embattled heights, rising 
500 feet above the plain, trenched with earthworks, held by su- 
perior numbers, gleaming with bayonets, and with sixteen bat- 
teries ready to open upon them at the first steps of an advance, 
what would those grovelers from the trenches do? True, three 
brigades of their fellows of the Chickamauga field had helped 
Hooker storm Lookout, and this very line itself had swept out 
from the city and carried the central entrenchments along which 
they stood. But they had not yet received the inspiration which 
might have been derived from seeing Sherman's troops fight. 
They only knew of him that the battle orders had been counter- 
manded three days in succession because he was not on time, 
and they had just heard that he had failed to carry the north 
end of the ridge, which was the key movement of the battle. 
What could these burrowers in trenches do? There was to be a 
signal of six guns from Orchard Knob to test that question. 

At 3:15 o'clock they began to sound. Ever}^ man of the 



32 Armij of the Cumberland. 

20,000 counted. At the sixth discharge there went up a mighty 
cheer, whicli rolled over the plains and re-echoed from the sur- 
rounding mountains. Eighty-nine regiments rushed for the 
earthworks at the base of tlie ridge — every soldier like an arrow 
shot from a string whicli iiad lono- been drawn to its full tension. 
Great guns in the outer works of the city threw shells over their 
heads, at base and slopes, and crest before them. Riflemen in 
the Confederate earthworks and belching batteries above pelted 
them with the varied hail of battle. The sun swung low in the 
west. It never looked, in all its shining over battle-fields upon 
a more imposing rush. Two miles and a half of gleaming 
rifle barrels, line after line of them, and more than 150 banners 
blossoming along the advance. Not a straggler — only the killed 
and wounded dropped from those ranks. They swept over the 
lower earthworks, capturing many prisoners, and, except on the 
part of the line where there was a brief confusion of orders, 
they every-where swarmed up the slopes. The colors rushed in 
advance, and the men crowded toward the banners. Each regi- 
ment became a wedge-shaped mass, the flags at the cutting edge 
cleaving the way to the summit. Without faltering, without a 
stay, the flags went on — not long, it is sadly true, in the same 
hands, but always in willing hands, and in an hour from the sound- 
ing of the signal guns for starting, the crest for three miles 
was crowned Avith the Stars and Stripes, Bragg's whole center 
was in flight, and forty of his guns and 2,000 prisoners were 
in the hands of Thomas's victorious army. The sun, which at 
at its rising lighted up that one flag on Lookout, smiled at its 
setting on the countless banners which a storming army had 
planted along the crest of Missionary Ridge. 

And here we are met with another of the persistent myths 
of history, and are told that Missionary Ridge was carried without 
orders and solely by the inspiration of the lines, and that the 
movement only contemplated carrying the rifle pits at the base. 



jJnnual Address. 33 



IIi)i)Ki:u"s coluinn had hecii sent forward iVoiii Lookout 
toward Kossville, at 10 o'clock. The destruction of" the bridge 
over Chattanooga Creek delayed him till 1 o'clock. Grant says 
ill his report that Hooker's advance astride the ridge at Ross- 
ville was to be the signal for '' storraini^ the ridfje in the center 
with strong columns," but seeing Sherman pressed and believing 
that Hooker must be near, he ordered Thomas to move forward his 
force "and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, 
and when carried to reform his lines in the rifle-pits, with a 
view to carrying the top of the ridge. These troops moved 
forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the 
ridge like bees from a hive — stopped but a moment until the 
whole were in line — and commenced the ascent of the mountain 
from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the 
retreating enemy without further orders." While, during the 
night, General Grant had written General Thomas : " Your 
command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in 
front of them or move to the left as the presence of the enemy 
may require," thus leaving the question of assaulting the ridge 
to his discretion, still, at the time Grant ordered the Army of 
the Cumberland forward, he did not then intend a move beyond 
the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge. This is clear from the 
statement of General J. S. Fullerton in his " Century " 
article. He was then the Adjutant-General and cliief-of-staff 
of the Fourth Corps, and being on Orchard Knob at the time 
heard what he thus relates : 

"As soon as this movement (up the ridge) was seen from 
Orchard Knob, Grant turned quickly to Thomas, who stood by 
his side, and I heard him say angrily : ' Tho^lvs, who ordered 
those men up the ridge?" Thomas replied in his usual slow, 
quiet manner : ' I don't know, I did not.' Then addressing 
General Gordon Granger, he said : *• Did you order them up, 
Granger ? ' ' No,' said Granger, ' they started up without orders. 



SJf Army of tJie Cumberland. 

When those fellows get started nothing can stop them.' Gen- 
eral Grant said something to the eftect that somebody would 
suffer if it did not turn out well, and then turning, stoically 
watched the ridge. He gave no further orders." 

Now, let us see what orders General Thomas gave his line. 
They are found in General Baird's report: "I had just com- 
pleted the establishment of my line and was upon the left of it 
when a staff officer from Major-General Thomas brought verbal 
orders to move forward to the edge of the open ground which 
bordered the foot of Missionary Ridge, within striking distance 
of the rebel rifle-pits at its base, so as to be ready at a signal, 
which would be the firing of six guns from Orchard Knob, to 
dash forward and take those pits. He added this was intended 
as precautionary to a general assault on the mountain, and that 
it was doubtless designed by the Major-General commanding 
that I should take part in this movement, so that I would be fol- 
lowing his wishes were I to push on to the summit. I gave the 
necessary orders to the Third Brigade, and, passing on to the 
right, was in the act of communicating them to Colonel Van 
Derveer, of the Second, when firing from Orchard Knob be- 
gan." General Baird was even more explicit in communi- 
cating these orders to General Van Derveer. Looking up at 
the ridge, he said : " Van Derveer, it is evidently too steep for 
riding. You had better order your regimental officers to leave 
their horses." And the field officers of that command led the 
charge across the plain and up the ridge on foot. It is unneces- 
sary to discuss with this audience whether such orders, given in 
advance of starting, contemplated going to the top. At any 
rate, they served that purpose well. Likewise, on the other 
flank of General Thomas's line, the understanding was clear 
before starting that the crest was the objective. George Marsh, 
now of the Quartermaster's Department in Washington, was 
then a first sergeant in Carlin's Brigade, which had rejoined 



Annual Address. 35 



Johnson's line from IIookeu's column und formed the right 
of the storming line, has furnished a copy of his daily diary, 
and Avritten in it at the time is this: "We descended (Look- 
out) and prepared to assault Missionary Ridge, which is four 
or five miles Ions and 400 or 500 feet hifjh. We formed an 
immense line of battle in some woods at 8:15 p. m., where our 
Brigadier-General, W. P. Carlin, of Illinois, said to us : ' Boys, 
I don't want you to stop until we reach the top of that hill. 
Forward I' General Carlin rode his horse to the foot of the 
ridge and then turned him loose and scrambled up with the rest 
of us." 

General Carlin, in his report, records that he was ordered 
by General Johnson " to prepare to advance against the enemy 
on Missionary Ridge." Colonel Anson G. McCook, he being 
then on the extreme right of Carlin's brigade, and so the right 
of General Thomas's storming lines, says : " About 4 p. m. moved 
to the assault of Missionary Ridge." Captain R. E. A. Crofton, 
commanding the Sixteenth and Nineteenth United States In- 
fantry in Stoughton's brigade (the left of Johnson's division) 
says : " Having covered our front with a line of skirmishers, 
were ordered to storm Missionary Ridge." 

There was some momentary confusion of orders at two 
points of the line as to advancing beyond the rifle-pits, but even 
there the men rushed on, and without further orders, and by an 
inspiration of their own, carried the adjacent lines Avith them. 
But the reports, when analyzed, show clearly that whatever 
any others may have had in mind, Thomas's intention from 
the first was to start his lines for the top of the ridge. 

General Hooker's operations at the south end of Mission- 
ary Ridge near Rossville were also of a brilliant character. He 
succeeded in bridging Chattanooga creek, and the head of his 
column, Osterhaus's division, drove back the Confederate in- 
fantry and artillery, strongly posted in Rossville Gap, gained the 



36 Army of the Ciomherlarul. 

rear of Missionary Ridge and turned northward along its eastern 
base. Cruft's division ascended the ridge from the gap and 
moved at once on the flank of Bragg's troops, which extended 
beyond Thomas's right. Geary moved rapidly along the west- 
ern base of the ridge, and coming in sight of the right of 
Thomas's lines just crossing the crest, a half mile to the north- 
ward, face<l his forces tOAvard tlie ridge :iiid scaled it. The 
troops attempting to escape from Thomas, joined to those in po- 
sition on his right, gave each of Hooker's three divisions some 
short, sharp fighting, but nothing could resist those heroes of 
Lookout, and here also the victory was complete, and many pris- 
oners were captured. On the left of Thomas fighting continued 
until dusk. Baikd, on reaching the summit, wheeled to the left, 
or, rather, his officers and men precipitated themselves in mass 
upon Hardee's forces, which were attempting to flank them from 
that direction, and by dusk they were successfully beaten back. 
Sheridan, upon gaining the crest, immediately pushed down the 
eastern slope in pursuit, Avhile Wood was formed to resist attack 
from the right. Bragg's entire army, except the force to the 
left of Thomas and in front of Sherman, retreated in disordered 
flight, saving but few guns. 

Clerurne, before Sherman, had been able, even with his 
small force, to hold the bridge over the Chickamauga on his right, 
and when night fell he withdrew in order, saving all his guns 
and material. 

Thus ended the grandest spectacular battle of the war — per- 
haps of any war. The Confederacy had been again as seriously 
divided as when the Mississippi Avas opened. Its most thought- 
ful officers saw that its doom was sealed. Troops from nineteen 
Northern States fought in the battle. The cheering of the ban- 
ners on Lookout by those gathered armies was the voice of all 
the North proclaiming that there was no stronghold in the land 
from which secession could be successfully defended. 



Annual Address. 37 



Comrades : There is in these gloriously gilded metnoirf a 
joy and a reward that nothing else in life can bring to us or re- 
place. It is a past over which there has been nml slmll Ix- an 
enduring sunset whose soft and entrancing; colorinir ran never 
grow dim or disappear. And at the same time, doubling this 
joy and this reward, while tiie past thus glows in our memories, 
there is the sheen and the beauty of a morning surh as has 
never before held out its bright promise to any nation. 

For one, I believe that the vast majority of those who fought 
against us would, if foreign foes attacked, spring as quickly as 
any of us to the defense of our common flag. A quarter of a 
century has brought this about — a period which is but as a day 
in the life of a nation. He would indeed be impatient wlio 
looked for more speedy progress. 

While we glory in the deeds of every Union army and 
twine laurel for the brows of all our great commanders, we glory 
most because our lot was cast with that army which was organ- 
ized and baptized in battle by General Buell ; which reached 
its fightino; manhood under General Rosecrans, and which, 
under George H. Thomas, stood immovable at the Kelley Farm 
and on Snodgrass Hill, stormed the heights of Lookout Moun- 
tain and Missionary Ridge, and crushed Hood at Nashville. 
We now write his name above all names, and when history shall 
have rendered its final verdict upon the soldiers of the Union, 
we believe that Thomas will surely lead all the rest on tlie list 
of great soldiers and successful generals. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



013 702 487 1 ^ 



\ 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



013 702 487 1 



